• Skip to main content
  • Skip to primary sidebar
  • Skip to footer
  • Core Principles of Responsible AI
    • Accountability
    • Fairness
    • Privacy
    • Safety and Security
    • Sustainability
    • Transparency
  • Special Topics
    • AI in Industry
    • Ethical Implications
    • Human-Centered Design
    • Regulatory Landscape
    • Technical Methods
  • Living Dictionary
  • State of AI Ethics
  • AI Ethics Brief
  • šŸ‡«šŸ‡·
Montreal AI Ethics Institute

Montreal AI Ethics Institute

Democratizing AI ethics literacy

Regulatory Instruments for Fair Personalized Pricing

March 30, 2022

šŸ”¬ Research Summary by Renzhe Xu, a third year PhD student in Computer Science and Technology at Tsinghua University and his research interests include fair machine learning, causal inference, and data mining.

[Original paper by Renzhe Xu, Xingxuan Zhang, Peng Cui, Bo Li, Zheyan Shen, Jiazheng Xu]


Overview: Ā How can we regulate personalized pricing to ensure consumers’ benefits? In this work, we propose two simple but effective regulatory policies under an idealized circumstance. Our findings and insights shed light on regulatory policy design for the increasingly monopolized business in the digital era.


Introduction

Personalized pricing is a business strategy to charge different prices to individual consumers based on their characteristics and behaviors. It has become common practice in many industries nowadays due to the availability of a growing amount of high granular consumer data. The discriminatory nature of personalized pricing has triggered heated debates among policymakers and academics on how to design regulation policies to balance market efficiency and equity. In this work, we propose two sound policy instruments and investigate the optimal pricing strategy of a profit-maximizing monopoly under both regulatory constraints. We analyze the impact of imposing the proposed policies on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social welfare. We show that both proposed constraints can help balance consumer surplus and producer surplus at the expense of total surplus for common demand distributions.

Background

Personalized pricing, once considered the idealized construction of economic theories, has become common practice in many industries due to the availability of the increasing amount of consumer data. The main concern of personalized pricing is that it transfers value from consumers to shareholders, increasing inequality and inefficiency from a utilitarian standpoint. As a result, effective regulatory policies are required to balance the benefits between consumers and companies, which are measured as consumer surplus and producer surplus, respectively.

In this work, we study in designing effective policy instruments to balance consumer surplus and producer surplus. We consider the most straightforward scenario where a monopoly sells a single product with fixed marginal cost to different consumers. In addition, we assume that the monopoly can precisely estimate each consumers’ willingness to pay and the purpose of the monopoly is to find a personalized pricing strategy to maximize its revenue while remaining compliant with the policy instruments.

Proposed Policy instruments

We propose two sound policy instruments and prove their effectiveness in balancing consumer surplus and producer surplus. These two policies, named the difference and ratio constraints, are introduced to regulate the range of personalized prices by constraining the difference and ratio between the maximal price and minimal price, respectively. For example, a $2-difference constraint allows a pricing range [$1, $3] (3 – 1 = 2) but disallows [$1, $4] (4 – 1 = 3 > 2) while, a 2-ratio constraint allows [$2, $4] (4 / 2 = 2) but disallows [$2, $5] (5 / 2 = 2.5 > 2).

The constant in the constraints (such as $2 in the $2-difference constraint shown above) determines the intensity of the regulation. A smaller constant will lead to a stricter regulatory intensity in both constraints. Now consider the most extreme cases. On the one hand, when the constant becomes 0 in the difference constraint or becomes 1 in the ratio constraint, the regulatory intensity is the most strict and only uniform pricing (the price is fixed for all consumers) is allowed. On the other hand, when the constant becomes big enough, the regulation is very slight and perfect price discrimination is possible.

Theoretical results on consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social welfare

The results on social welfare analysis under both constraints are threefold. Graphical explanations of these findings are shown in the figure.

1. Both constraints can effectively balance the consumer surplus and producer surplus, which means the consumer surplus increases while the producer surplus decreases as the constraints become stricter.

2. We compare the trade-off between consumer surplus and producer surplus achieved by the two constraints and show that the difference constraint outperforms the ratio constraint. This means that the consumer surplus under the ratio constraint is smaller than that under the difference constraint if the producer surplus under the two constraints is equal.

3. Imposing either of the constraints will inevitably, to some extent, harm the total surplus. This result is reasonable, given that the efficiency-equity trade-off is largely recognized in practice. In addition, the perfect price discrimination achieves the maximal market efficiency and any regulatory policies to avoid it will inevitably harm the total surplus.

Empirical results

We run experiments on several real-world datasets to verify our theoretical results. The details of the datasets are provided as follows.

1. Coke and cake. Wertenbroch and Skiera [2002] adopted Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak’s method to estimate willingness-to-pay for a can of Coca-Cola on a public beach and a piece of pound cake on a commuter ferry in Kiel, Germany.

2. Elective vaccine. Slunge [2015] studied willingness to pay for vaccination against tick-borne encephalitis in Sweden. They asked individuals with personal information about take-up at a random price of 100, 250, 500, 750, or 1000 SEK.

3. Auto loan. The dataset records 208,085 auto loan applications received by a major online lender in the United States with loan-specific features. Following prior works, we adopt the feature selection results and consider only four features. The price of a loan is computed as the net present value of future payment minus the loan amount.

The trade-off curves between consumer surplus and producer surplus under our proposed constraints in these datasets are shown in the figure. The figure verifies that both constraints can help balance consumer surplus and producer surplus at the expense of total surplus. In addition, the curve of the ratio constraint is on top of the difference constraint.

Between the lines

We should notice that it is important to analyze the impacts of policies in fair personalized pricing theoretically. Improperly designed policies may harm both consumers and producers. For example, Dubé and Misra [2021] found that finer-grained personalized pricing in third-degree price discrimination can increase consumer welfare, which is contrary to the common belief that personalized pricing will always harm consumers.

In addition, comparatively, the ratio constraint is more suitable for designing policies because ratios could be easily adapted to various scenarios. The difference constraint has better performance on the trade-off between consumer surplus and producer surplus. As a result, the two constraints could be adopted in different applications in practice.

Want quick summaries of the latest research & reporting in AI ethics delivered to your inbox? Subscribe to the AI Ethics Brief. We publish bi-weekly.

Primary Sidebar

šŸ” SEARCH

Spotlight

AI Policy Corner: Frontier AI Safety Commitments, AI Seoul Summit 2024

AI Policy Corner: The Colorado State Deepfakes Act

Special Edition: Honouring the Legacy of Abhishek Gupta (1992–2024)

AI Policy Corner: The Turkish Artificial Intelligence Law Proposal

From Funding Crisis to AI Misuse: Critical Digital Rights Challenges from RightsCon 2025

related posts

  • Governing AI to Advance Shared Prosperity

    Governing AI to Advance Shared Prosperity

  • Consequences of Recourse In Binary Classification

    Consequences of Recourse In Binary Classification

  • Consent as a Foundation for Responsible Autonomy

    Consent as a Foundation for Responsible Autonomy

  • Theorizing Femininity in AI: a Framework for Undoing Technology’s Gender Troubles (Research Summary)

    Theorizing Femininity in AI: a Framework for Undoing Technology’s Gender Troubles (Research Summary)

  • Research Summary: Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks

    Research Summary: Towards Evaluating the Robustness of Neural Networks

  • Bound by the Bounty: Collaboratively Shaping Evaluation Processes for Queer AI Harms

    Bound by the Bounty: Collaboratively Shaping Evaluation Processes for Queer AI Harms

  • The Unequal Opportunities of Large Language Models: Revealing Demographic Bias through Job Recommend...

    The Unequal Opportunities of Large Language Models: Revealing Demographic Bias through Job Recommend...

  • Zoom Out and Observe: News Environment Perception for Fake News Detection

    Zoom Out and Observe: News Environment Perception for Fake News Detection

  • Managing Human and Robots Together - Can That Be a Leadership Dilemma?

    Managing Human and Robots Together - Can That Be a Leadership Dilemma?

  • Mind your Language (Model): Fact-Checking LLMs and their Role in NLP Research and Practice

    Mind your Language (Model): Fact-Checking LLMs and their Role in NLP Research and Practice

Partners

  • Ā 
    U.S. Artificial Intelligence Safety Institute Consortium (AISIC) at NIST

  • Partnership on AI

  • The LF AI & Data Foundation

  • The AI Alliance

Footer

Categories


• Blog
• Research Summaries
• Columns
• Core Principles of Responsible AI
• Special Topics

Signature Content


• The State Of AI Ethics

• The Living Dictionary

• The AI Ethics Brief

Learn More


• About

• Open Access Policy

• Contributions Policy

• Editorial Stance on AI Tools

• Press

• Donate

• Contact

The AI Ethics Brief (bi-weekly newsletter)

About Us


Founded in 2018, the Montreal AI Ethics Institute (MAIEI) is an international non-profit organization equipping citizens concerned about artificial intelligence and its impact on society to take action.


Archive

  • Ā© MONTREAL AI ETHICS INSTITUTE. All rights reserved 2024.
  • This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
  • Learn more about our open access policy here.
  • Creative Commons License

    Save hours of work and stay on top of Responsible AI research and reporting with our bi-weekly email newsletter.